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NOTHING BUT THE FACTS:
AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS
OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA
ChristyM DeMelf*

Introduction: Importance of the Issue
With the current uncertain state of the United States' economy, any
measure to improve the economy would be welcomed. If the U.S. were to sell
more goods, either at home or abroad, the increase in demand might strengthen
the U.S. economy enough to foster a turn around. The question arises, how to
sell more goods. One obvious answer would be for the U.S. economy to enter
into a new market. In this globalized world economy, it may be difficult to find
such a market for U.S. goods or services. By looking no further than 90 miles
off the southern coast of Florida, however, one finds such an untapped
economy: Cuba.
Although opening trade with Cuba may help alleviate some of the
United States' economic woes, the U.S. has refused to lift its 46 year embargo.
Why? Policy makers find it politically difficult to lift the sanctions because of
the authoritarian nature of the Cuban government. The economic sanctions are
seen as a way for the U. S. to display its disapproval of communism and uphold
the American ideals of freedom and democracy. Policy makers are concerned
that lifting the sanctions may give off the appearance of weakness in U.S.
foreign policy. There is debate, however, over whether the sanctions actually
accomplish their objectives. Even if they do, there is further debate as to
whether the sanctions cause serious harm to the U.S. economy. The costs and
benefits of the situation, from both economic and political perspectives, must be
analyzed properly to ensure the correct policy is being instituted. The current
state of the economy thus makes the topic of sanctions against Cuba an
.
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important issue because the U.S. is in need of measures that will help the
economy recover.
This article will seek to analyze the state of affairs in detail, in order to
provide an increased understanding of this situation. The article will begin by
giving a general overview of the country of Cuba, by providing basic facts on
its government, demographics, government, and economy. The article will next
explore a theoretical analysis of economic sanctions. A clear definition of
economic sanctions will then be presented along with a discussion on the types,
purposes, and effects of economic sanctions. Then a historical overview of
general economic sanctions will be presented. The article next turns to the
history of the Cuban embargo, followed by a brief overview of the current
situation.
Theories of international trade that may be helpful to explain sanctions
are addressed in the next section. This discussion includes models in both a
general and partial equilibrium framework. Next, an assessment of the Cuban
embargo will be presented where the sanctions against Cuba, as well as its
specific objectives are defined and explained. An assessment of these goals will
then be presented, followed by an overview of U.S.-Cuban relations before the
implementation of the embargo. Then economic effects of the embargo are
discussed using the models presented earlier and various trade statistics. Also
in this section, the actual effects of the embargo on both Cuba and the U.S. are
addressed.
The article will then present a policy debate focusing on arguments for
lifting and keeping the embargo. Following the policy debate, outlooks for the
future, as well as recommendations to policy makers are discussed. Finally a
conclusion will follow summarizing the main points of the article.
Cuba: Geography and Demographics
The Republic of Cuba, or simply Cuba, is an island located 90 miles
south of Key West, Florida. The island is slightly smaller than Pennsylvania,
yet is the largest Caribbean island.
Climate is classified as tropical, however, there is a separate dry and
rainy season from November to April, and May to October, respectively. Plains
make up most of Cuba's terrain, but some hills and mountains are found in the
south east. Several natural resources are found in the country, including cobalt,
nickel, copper, iron ore, salt, timber, manganese, petroleum, silica, and arable
land.
Over eleven million people live in Cuba, most of which, sixty nine
percent, are aged 15 to 64. (World Fact Book, 2002, pg. 3) There is a negative
net migration rate out of Cuba at -1.21 migrants/1000 population (World Fact
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Book, 2002, pg. 3) which is most likely caused by the large amount of Cubans
that flee the country in order to enter the U.S. This illegal migration into the
U.S. is quite significant each year. It was estimated that 5,400 Cubans
attempted to enter the U.S. illegally in 2000, and only 750 were prevented by
the U.S. Coast Guard. (World Fact Book, 2002, pg.4)
Most, fifty one percent, Cubans are mulatto; however, thirty seven
percent of the citizens are white. Spanish is spoken in this country, like most of
Central and South America. Roman Catholic is the predominate religion,
comprising eighty five percent of the population. (World Fact Book, 2002, pg.
4)
According to social development standards, Cuba is doing quite well.
The country has a very low population growth rate at only .35 percent. (World
Fact Book, 2002, pg. 3) Life expectancy in Cuba is also good, at 79 for females
and 74 for males. (World Fact Book, 2002, pg. 4) In addition, there is a high
literacy rate, at ninety six and ninety five percent for males and females,
respectively. (World Fact Book, 2002, pg. 4)
Cuba: Government and Economy
Cuba, one of the last communist nations in the world, is headed by
Fidel Castro Ruz. The government is located in the capital city of Havana. Its
legal system is based on Spanish and American Law; however, elements of
communist legal theory are present. Along with an executive branch, there is
also a unicameral legislative branch called the "National Assembly of People's
Power," and a judicial branch known as the "People's Supreme Court."
Economically speaking, Cuba is a command economy, meaning the
government controls the economy. Like other command economies, Cuba faces
problems with efficiency, and thus has seen its Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
stall at $25.9 billion. (World Fact Book, 2002, pg. 6) The major component,
fifty eight percent, of GDP is services, followed by industry at thirty five
percent of GDP. (World Fact Book 2002, pg. 6) If one looks at the sector
composition of GDP, it appears that Cuba should be fairly prosperous; however,
the GDP per capita remains low at $2300. (World Fact Book, 2002, pg. 6) This
is due in part to the composition of the labor force, of which twenty five percent
is in agriculture. (World Fact Book, 2002, pg. 7) Much of the low per capita
can be explained simply by the nature of the economy.
There are a large number of industrial and agricultural goods produced
in Cuba. The industrial goods that are produced include petroleum, tobacco,
chemicals, construction, services, nickel, steel, cement, agricultural machinery,
and biotechnology. The main agricultural products are livestock, beans,
potatoes, rice, coffee, citrus, tobacco, and sugar. Of the goods produced, sugar,
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nickel, and tobacco are the main exports. Fish, citrus, coffee and medical
products are also exported by Cuba. The main imports of the country are
petroleum, food, chemicals, machinery, and equipment.
Definition of Economic Sanctions
Economic sanctions are the most common tool in international politics.
Sanctions serve as an important aspect of foreign policy, because of the
frequency with which they are used. In order to understand why sanctions are
so important, one must first know the definition of a sanction. An economic
sanction can be defined as a restriction imposed on one country, the target, by
another country, the sender. This restriction is meant to persuade the target
country to change a policy by affecting international commerce engaged in by
the target. In other words, sanctions are policy tools imposed by a country to
influence another country in order to achieve some political goal.
Types of Economic Sanctions
There are many types of sanctions which a country can choose to
implement. Many of the sanctions are various restrictions on trade, including
arms embargoes, export and import tariffs (Haass, 1998, pg. 2) or even full
trade embargoes. Countries may also prohibit financial involvement in another
country, which prevents financial transactions between citizens. (O'Quinn,
1997, pg. 3) Countries may even just place an overall restriction on credit,
financing, and investment. (Haass, 1998, pg. 2) This will cause the economic
growth of the target country to decline due to a decrease in foreign direct
investment (FDI), which is a type of capital flow between countries. This type
of investment "gives the lender operating ownership and control over the
borrower." (Yarbrough and Yarbrough, 2000, pg. 383) The country which
capital flows out of is the lender, while the receiving country is the borrower.
Political maneuvers may also act as economic sanctions. Such
maneuvers include visa denials, cancellation of air links, as well as foreign
assistance reductions and cutoffs. Revocation of most-favored-nation trade
status, votes in international organizations or a complete withdrawal of
diplomatic relations can also be used as economic sanctions.
As described by Randy Newnham, there are two broad categories of
sanctions: specific economic linkage and general economic linkage. Specific
economic linkage is a "state directly linking economic actions to a political
demand on a target state." (Newnham, 2002, pg. 1) General economic linkage
can be defined as "using economic aid or penalties to influence a country in a
general way." (Newnham, 2002, pg. 1)
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Newnham goes on to distinguish between two other types of sanctions:
positive and negative sanctions. A positive sanction is one often overlooked by
many analysts but as Corthrigh and Lopen said, they are "more useful than
many believe." (Newnham, 2002, pg. 8) An example of a positive sanction
would be granting most-favored-nation status to a country for making a change
the sender country wanted. When most people think of sanctions; however,
they think of negative ones, which often occurs when one country seeks to
punish another for some action.
Sanctions may be applied in one of two ways: unilaterally, or
multilaterally. When one country imposes a sanction against another, it is an
example of a unilateral sanction. The important element here is that only one
nation imposes the sanction. Because there are many other potential trade
partners, when sanctions are unilateral, the target country simply finds another
supplier/buyer. For this reason, unilateral sanctions rarely produce the desired
effect. If sanctions are implied multilaterally, it is much easier for the desired
result to occur. A multilateral sanction is imposed by a group of countries on
another country or countries. For this reason, the sender country often needs to
find international support of the sanction. This method of application is
preferred because the chance of success is greater. At times international
organizations, such as the United Nations or World Trade Organization, initiate
sanctions in order to control our global society. One recent example of such
sanctions is those imposed by the United Nations against Iraq.
Purpose of Economic Sanctions
The exact purpose of economic sanctions varies by situation.
According to Richard N. Haass, director of the Foreign Policy Study of the
Brookings Institute in Washington, D.C., there are four basic purposes of
economic sanctions. These purposes are deterrence, punishment, coercion, and
signaling. Deterrence is the goal of trying to prevent something from occurring,
while coercion is trying to convince a country to act in a certain way.
Punishment and signaling are similar goals in that they both express a dislike of
another country's actions. Punishment is done after the action has occurred,
while signaling is done prior to the action. Sanctions may be implemented in
order to achieve any one or a combination of these goals. Although there are
only four main purposes of sanctions, there are many more specific goals which
fall under one of the general categories.
One common reason for imposing economic sanctions is to achieve a
national security objective. The basic goal may be "to deter military aggression
or to force an aggressor to withdraw its armed forces from a disputed territory."
(O'Quinn, 1997, pg. 4) Another goal may be to "discourage the proliferation of
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weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, end support for terrorism or
discourage armed aggression." (Haass, 1998, pg. 1) In this case, the sanctions
will serve as a signal for a country to discontinue its threat to the sender
country's security or else face military action. The goal of a sanction may even
be the replacement of a government if the threat from that regime is very high.
There are other political or humanitarian objectives that sanctions may
seek to fulfill. Sanctions can be implemented for a variety of purposes, from
protecting the environment to preventing illegal drug trafficking. When
imposed against non-democratic states, the sanctions typically seek to aid in
democratization. Often in such states, sanctions are also used to promote the
rights of workers. Between democratic states, sanctions are used to resolve
international trade and investment disagreements. When imposed in such a
way, sanctions are used to "ensure market access or compliance with trade
agreements." (Haass, 1998, pg. 1)
The mere threat of sanctions also serves a purpose. A threat of a
sanction can increase the bargaining power of the sender country. The threat
will serve as a way to protect the country in all negotiations with other
countries. A very common reason for applying sanctions is to appease the
public. Here sanctions serve as an important political maneuver where one
country can take action against another without using military force.
Even though sanctions are imposed frequently, they do not always
achieve their objectives. Sometimes only part of the original goal is achieved,
while in other cases a completely different outcome is realized.
Economic Effects of Economic Sanctions
The concept of economic sanctions is simply to put pressure on the
economy of the target country. This strain is brought about by affecting trade
patterns of the target nation by imposing one of the various types of sanctions.
One effect of sanctions is a reduction in income of the target country due to a
decrease in exports. The import sector of a country is affected, thus sanctions
may force a country to buy necessary goods from other suppliers who are often
higher priced. This in turn causes the cost of imports to rise. If sanctions are
imposed multilaterally, however, a nation's ability to use alternative suppliers
may be greatly reduced, forcing the country into an autarky state. This would
drive the cost of imports even higher or may even completely cut off a country
from a certain good. This could force the country to have to produce the good
domestically or no longer use the good.
Even though economic sanctions are intended to have negative effects
on the economy of the target country, they also affect the economy of the
country or countries imposing them. In addition to having a general negative
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effect on the economy, sanctions can also affect individual companies and
employees. There are many negative consequences of imposing sanctions, such
as lower exports, less foreign investments, fewer jobs in the export sector, and
loss of market share in the global economy. (O'Quinn, 1997, pg. 9)
A decrease in the direct foreign investment a country receives can have
severe effects on its economy. When this reduction occurs, companies that rely
on those funds may be forced to cut back production. In turn this will reduce
the number ofjobs available in that sector. The subsequent drop in employment
may cause a decrease in consumer spending and trigger a downward spiral in
the economy. Most jobs are not completely destroyed by a sanction because
over time many of the workers will be absorbed into other sectors of the
economy. Although the employment rate will return to near normal, the value
of the workers in the new sectors is lower than the original value of production.
Lost market share of businesses in the imposing country can also be a
consequence of economic sanctions. In such a case, because of the lost market
share, those companies will sell fewer goods. This decrease in demand will
thus cause jobs to be cut in the economy. It is clear that the negative
consequences of economic sanctions in the imposing country can be quite
severe. To put this into perspective, the Council on Competitiveness found that
"eight specific sanctions cost the U.S. economy $6 billion in annual export sales
and 120,000 export related jobs." (O'Quinn, 1997, pg. 9) Even though the U.S.
economy is very large, with a GDP over $10 trillion, (Work Fact Book 2002) a
loss of that magnitude can not be written off as totally insignificant.
It is tempting to believe that the easy way to solve the problem of the
negative consequences would be to lift the sanctions. The solution, however, is
not always that simple. Even after sanctions have been lifted there may be
continuing negative effects. In order to regain lost market share in the target
country, U.S. companies may be forced to transfer technology, cut prices, or
make unusual concessions. Another long term consequence may be strained
international relationships. These relationships may be harmed between the
sender and the target country as well as between other countries not directly
involved. Sometimes after sanctions have been lifted, the target country
remains hostile toward the sender country. Relationships with potential trade
partners can also be affected by sanctions. Here, the threat of sanctions being
imposed causes unnecessary fear in these nations, harms those relationships.
History of Economic Sanctions
Economic sanctions in some form have been part of international trade
from the beginning of time. Ever since countries have traded with each other,
one country has always tried to manipulate, or gain an advantage over the other.
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The first modem example of sanctions occurred in the 1930's when Germany
used the "manipulation of trade to gain security advantages." (Newnham, 2002,
pg. 5) Here, trade manipulation was used by Germany in order for the country
to pave the way for its military conquests in World War II.
In political science, there are two competing views on what is the most
important issue for a country. The realist view, which emphasizes national
security, dominated the world of political thought from the 1930's to 1950's.
According to this view, everything, including the economy, was of secondary
importance. Since the 1950's however, the liberal view has gained momentum.
This view puts less emphasis on issues of power in regards to national security.
Instead, the liberal view focuses "on the use of economic power to solve
economic problems." (Newnham, 2000, pg. 8)
Since the beginning of the liberal movement the importance of
sanctions has increased. Since World War II, economic sanctions have played a
major part in international relations. Between World War II and 1984, there
were ninety one cases of economic sanctions. (Carter, 1988, pg. 10) The U.S.
took part in imposing sanctions in sixty two of those cases, which is the most of
any country. (Carter, 1988, pg. 11) Today, sanctions serve as the most
important political tool a country possesses because they are widely used and
preferred to military action.
Sanctions are regarded as successful if the overall objective was
reached. The success rate however has greatly varied. Overall, U.S. sanctions
were only successful thirty seven percent of the time. (Carter, 1988, pg. 14)
The success rate also varies according to the type of goal sought. The two most
successful kinds of sanctions are those with the goal of destabilization or
modest policy goals. Examples of such goals include creating tension against
the current government, and encouraging minor policy changes, respectively.
Destabilization goals have been reached in sixty seven percent of the cases,
while modest policy goals have been achieved forty percent of the time.
(Carter, 1988, pg. 23) Sanctions that are typically unsuccessful include those
that seek to disrupt military adventures, to impair the military potential of the
target country and to induce major policy changes.
There are several specific cases of successful sanctions since World
War II. In World War II, a trade embargo imposed by the Allies kept strategic
materials from being bought from neutral countries. The embargo was placed
into effect by the Allies, including the U.S. and Great Britain, on the Axis
countries of Germany and Japan. It can be said this embargo "played at least a
modest role in the defeat of the Axis countries." (Carter, 1988, pg. 10)
Sanctions were also at least partially successful during the Cold War. In the
mid 1970's, the mere threat of financial and export sanctions by the U.S. and
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Canada helped prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. This threat persuaded
South Korea not to purchase a plant that could produce nuclear weapons.
Sanctions in the form of reductions in military and economic
assistance were successful against Brazil from 1977 to 1984. The sanctions
helped to increase respect for human rights in the country, by helping to remove
the threat of political repression and torture. Sanctions were also successful
against Haiti. Here a suspension of foreign assistance also helped to overthrow
their government in 1986.
There are also many examples of the failure of sanctions. The two
most famous examples, other than Cuba, concern sanctions against Pakistan and
Iraq. During the Cold War, sanctions could not persuade Pakistan to fully
accept multilateral safeguards. The sanctions imposed multilaterally by the
U.N. against Iraq have been unsuccessful for a number of years. Originally, the
sanctions were imposed to punish Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait. However,
once the Gulf War was won, the sanctions were not lifted. The U.N. did not lift
the sanctions in hopes of gaining leverage that could be used to encourage Iraqi
disarmament. It is obvious that the leverage the U.N. hoped to gain did not
actually happen. Saddam Hussein showed great disrespect for the U.N. and was
often cited as saying their inspections were a joke.
When Hussein was still in power, disarmament did not take place to its
full extent. If the sanctions would have been successful in persuading the
country to disarm, when the U.N. inspectors searched Iraq at the end of the Gulf
War they would not have found anything in violation of the peace agreement. It
is puzzling that Hussein was found in violation of the agreement, yet the U.N.
did nothing.
Recent events involving the war with Iraq have shown that the
sanctions did not achieve their desired goal. If the sanctions had been effective,
the war would have been unnecessary and full disarmament would have
occurred. This however was not the case. When the sanctions were the only
measure taken against Iraq, Hussein acted without regard to the consequences.
Because the sanctions alone did not force any political change, nor did they
achieve disarmament, the sanctions must be considered a failure.
History of the Cuban Embargo
In the midst of the Cold War, the U.S. took a strong stance against
communism when it applied economic sanctions against Cuba. Although the
sanctions began many years ago, it still is a subject of great controversy, and
has been dealt with by every President since 1960. The U.S. government
imposed the sanction because it was concerned about Cuba forming an alliance
with the Soviet Union that would establish a totalitarian regime in Cuba. The
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U.S. was greatly concerned about this possibility because of the extensive trade
with Cuba. In addition, the possibility of a nation so close to the U.S. being
aligned with the Soviet Union alarmed many in the U.S. government.
The U.S. policies towards Cuba have changed over the years.
According to Donna Kaplowitz the embargo can be divided into five different
stages. These periods are: 1) 1960-1962, 2) 1962-1970, 3) 1971-1980, 4) 19811989, and 5) 1989-1996. (Kaplowitz, 1998, pg. 2) We are currently in a
transition period that began in 1996. In general, the history of the sanctions is
characterized by alternating periods of strengthening and weakening of the
sanction's terms.
In 1960, Dwight D. Eisenhower was the first US President to impose
sanctions against Cuba. This was a mere year after Fidel Castro led a rebel
army into power. At this time, the U.S. developed and imposed a unilateral
sanction against Cuba. It was then that all exports to Cuba were prohibited. In
1961, the U.S. fears of an alliance between Cuba and the Soviet Union were
strengthened when the two nations signed a trade agreement. This reaffirmed
the basic reason for imposing the sanction.
The second period of the sanctions began on February 3, 1962 when a
full trade embargo was imposed against Cuba, meaning that both exports and
imports were completely restricted. By 1964, all imports, exports, and finance
between the U.S. and Cuba were banned. This action was taken because the
Kennedy Administration was "convinced that Castro was moving rapidly
toward the establishment of a totalitarian regime in alliance with the Soviet
Union." (Varona, 1994, pg. 7)
This period is defined by efforts on behalf of the U.S. to include other
countries in the embargo. The embargo was tightened further in July of 1964
when the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) expanded the embargo to
the entire continent of South America. The O.A.S. made this decision to
support the U.S. embargo because Cuba was repeatedly involved in aggressive
acts against its member countries. The O.A.S. governments' were angered by
Cuba's support of many violent revolutions occurring throughout the Americas.
The embargo was first loosened during the 1970's. During this
decade, several countries resumed trade with Cuba. Castro sought to resume
trade relationships with the O.A.S. countries because of the failure of Cuba's
economic policies.
Imports from Latin America in 1958 before the
implementation of the embargo was at $84 million. Just over ten years later,
during the heart of the O.A.S. ban, trade with Latin America hit an all time low,
with both exports and imports valued only at $1 million each. Eventually, many
O.A.S. countries resumed trade with Cuba, because of the mutual economic
benefit.
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In 1974, President Gerald Ford looked into improving the overall
relations between the U.S. and Cuba. Products made by U.S. subsidiaries in
Latin America were allowed to be exported to Cuba in 1975; however, there
was a limit on which products could be exported. Only products that had less
than twenty percent U.S. made content could be exported. In this same year,
the O.A.S. ban was completely lifted. Once the sanctions of the O.A.S. were
lifted, trade with between Cuba and Latin America quickly increased. By the
end of 1975, imports from other Latin American countries to the island nation
reached $230 million.
President Jimmy Carter continued loosening the sanctions during his
term. He relaxed the travel restrictions during the late 1970's, and established
two interests sections in various embassies. In 1977, a U.S. interests section
was set up in the Swiss embassy in Havana and a Cuban interests section was
set up in the Czech embassy in Washington.
This trend was reversed in the 1980's, however, when Ronald Reagan
was elected President. Reagan "entered office intent on reversing the tide of
Soviet-Cuban advancements throughout the Third World." (Varona, 1994, pg.
9) The period from 1981-1989 is characterized by a tightening of the embargo.
A partial ban on travel was re-imposed in 1982, and subsidiaries were strongly
warned not to exceed limits established on trade content.
The tightening continued during the next period from 1989 to 1996.
During this period efforts were once again made to globalize the embargo. This
created animosity among the U.S. allies who expressed strong anti-embargo
sentiment. It was during this period that the U.S. lost the support of regional
and international organizations. This is shown by the many votes in the United
Nations that condemn the U.S. policy towards Cuba. In fact, for ten years the
General Assembly has called for the end of the embargo. (Reuters, 2001, pg. 1)
In October of 1992, President George Bush signed the Cuban
Democracy Act into law. It was enacted because of "Castro's refusal to
introduce democratic reforms and the increasing incidence of human rights
violations on the island." (Kaplowitz, 1998, pg. 9) This act tried to make the
embargo world-wide by closing the subsidiary loophole for trade. This act also
"encouraged U.S. foreign aid recipient nations to avoid providing assistance to
Cuban regime." (Kaplowitz, 1998, pg. 10)
The Helms-Burton Act of 1996 signed by President Bill Clinton
expanded the embargo extraterritorially.
This act "seeks to discourage
investment in Cuba by imposing sanctions on foreign companies profiting from
property confiscated by the Castro regime." (Vasquez and Rodriguez, 1996, pg.
1) The act tries to discourage third parties from being involved in business
activities that use or profit from the use of property that was confiscated in 1959
by the Cuban government. A major provision of the act allows U.S. nationals
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who had property confiscated to file law suits in U.S. district courts to recover
damages. It also states anyone who participates in activities involving
confiscated property may be banned from visiting the U.S. Another provision
limits the ability of the U.S. President to cease the sanctions against Cuba. The
last main provision called for the U.S. executive branch to improve enforcement
of current laws relating to Cuba, such as tightening the existing sanctions.
Current Situation
The most current period, from 1996 to the present, is one filled with
confusion. Although both President Clinton and President George W. Bush
have been against the relaxation of the sanction, there has been increased
disapproval of the embargo among the American people. "A growing coalition
of U.S. critics - liberal Democrats, Catholic bishops, agribusiness giants,
libertarian free-traders - argues that the embargo is an antiquated relic."
(Jacoby, 2002, pg. 2) The concerns of the critics have led to lobbying of
members of the U.S. Congress, several of whom now support easing the
sanctions. In fact, the House of Representatives passed legislation in July 2002
that would "ease restrictions on trade and travel to Cuba." (Boston Globe,
2002, pg. 1) Even former President Carter has been getting in on the debate.
The Carter Center and Carter himself have been pushing the idea that the best
way to promote change in Cuba is "through maximum contacts between our
two countries." (Keen, 2002, pg. 2)
Thus far President Bush seems unfazed by the growing dissent, and
has vowed to continue with a hard-line stance against Cuba. Bush has taken
such a stance in response to the demands of the Cubans in Florida who typically
vote Republican. In order to be elected Bush needed their support, and thus
appeared to be committed to following their demands. For this same reason,
humanitarian efforts, such as allowing trade for food have been allowed in
Cuba.
Economic Models
The basic theory behind an embargo is simple: one country harms
another by forcing it into an autarky state. This is accomplished by cutting off a
country's trading partners in order to force a country to be self-sufficient. In
reality, the target country never becomes a true autarky because of the presence
of other potential trading partners throughout the world. The effects of moving
from free trade to autarky can be analyzed in a general equilibrium framework
or a partial equilibrium model.
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In order to understand the models, one must have an understanding of
various economic concepts, including a production possibilities frontier and
indifference curves. A production possibilities frontier (PPF) graphically shows
the different combinations of two goods that can be produced using a set
amount of resources. Indifference curves represent a combination of two goods
which yield the same utility, or welfare. The indifference curves closest to the
origin have the lowest utility, while those farther from the origin yield higher
utility.
General Equilibrium
The neoclassical model of trade provides a general equilibrium
framework, which analyzes the effects of sanctions on the country as a whole.
Under free trade, the neoclassical model would appear as figure 1, Neoclassical
Free Trade. In this model, the production capabilities of two countries for two
goods are graphed using a production possibilities frontier. The world price
ratio (Px/Py) of the two goods in a country is graphed as well, in order to
determine the optimal production point. This optimal production point is where
the PPF is tangent to the price line, at point pF in the graph. This point shows
the highest level of production that can be reached by using only the resources
available, and given the current prices.
According to this model, under free trade a country can consume
beyond its production capability by trading. As seen in the figure, under free
trade a country will produce at point pF, but will consume different amounts of
both goods, represented by point CF. The country will face a situation where it
produces more of one good than it consumes and thus exports this good to other
countries. It will then import the other good, which it consumes more of than it
produces from another country. This graph shows that this country will export
good X in the amount of DF. The country will then import good Y in the
amount of AB. Remember, the actual consumption point after trade must lie on
the price line, PxF/PvF.
The corresponding indifference curve of the
consumption bundle is also graphed to show the welfare associated with this
bundle. The welfare achieved by this bundle of consumption is represented by
indifference curve ICF.
By forcing a country to move to autarky, the sender country is trying to
reduce the target country's welfare. The receiving country's welfare will be
reduced because it can only consume what it produces. Consider figure 2:
Neoclassical Autarky. By adding to the graph for Neoclassical Free Trade, one
can see the consequences of a move to autarky. When enforcing the embargo,
the consumption and production points will move to point pA, because the
relative prices change to pxA/PYA, reflecting the prices that occur in the
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domestic market. At this point, production in the economy is equal to
consumption, because all that is consumed must be produced domestically since
trade is no longer a valid option. In this situation both imports and exports
equal zero. This moves society down to a new different indifference curve, ICA.
Since the new indifference curve is closer to the origin than the free trade one,
ICF, then by definition the welfare of the country has decreased.
This analysis assumes that the sanctions are imposed multilaterally by
all countries against the target. In reality, the sanctions are rarely imposed by
every country in the world. In order to be more realistic, the neoclassical model
must be expanded to include three countries. Consider figure 3, Neoclassical
Embargo Reality. In this model, one country would be the sender, one would
be the target and the other can represent the rest of the world. The third country
will continue to trade with both countries without regard to the sanction. When
doing this analysis the true effects of the sanction cannot be determined without
knowing the relative prices of all three countries.
In general, the effects of trade will still be present as described above;
however, they will now be less dramatic. Production is this scenario moves to
pE, and consumption moves to CE. The country now imports less goods in the
amount IK, and exports less goods in the amount of LJ, as compared to AB and
DF respectively, under free trade. Instead of pushing the country back to
autarky, if effective, the embargo will push consumption back to ICE, resulting
in lower utility than the free trade scenario, but higher than autarky.
Import Sector Partial Equilibrium
The neoclassical model argues that there are two goods in the
economy, one which is imported, and one which is exported. As a result, if the
target is small and the sender country is large, the effect of the embargo for the
sender country in a general equilibrium sense would be small. However, .the
impact on specific sectors of the economy could be large, even when the target
is a small country. In order to understand the effects of the embargo on a
specific sector, one must use a partial equilibrium analysis.
When considering the effects of an embargo in partial equilibrium, one
can view the embargo as a quota. When one country imposes an embargo
against another it is like the former's government restricting imports from a free
trade level to the level of zero. An embargo prohibits all imports; therefore, the
imports would be at a level of zero. Another sanction, a quota may also limit
the amount of imports to zero. One can then draw a parallel between the two,
and view an embargo as a quota of zero.
Under partial equilibrium free trade, the graph would look like figure
4, Import Sector Partial Equilibrium Free Trade. On a graph, the supply and
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demand curves, S and D respectively, are drawn for the imported good. The
world price of the good is then graphed as a horizontal line below the
intersection of the supply and demand. Supply and demand quantities are
determined by the intersection of each line with the price line. At the world
price, the country will produce at point A, but demands a level of goods at point
B. The amount of imports is shown as the difference between the supply and
demand at the world price level. In this graph, the level of a good supplied will
be different than at equilibrium. To meet the excess demand of the people, the
country must import the difference between its production and consumption
points, the amount of AB.
The welfare of a section of the economy can be seen using a partial
equilibrium framework. In such a framework, one can distinguish between the
welfare gained by consumers and the welfare gained by producers. The welfare
of consumers is referred to as consumer surplus, while producers' welfare is
called producer surplus. The producer surplus is the area above the supply
curve up to the price level. Under free trade, it would be the area HEA. The
consumer surplus is given by the area above the price line and below the
demand curve. Before the quota of zero was imposed, this area was GEB.
The graph would be different under an import quota of zero, as shown
in figure 5, Import Sector Partial Equilibrium Zero Quota. The quota of zero
would decrease the level of imports to where supply equals demand at point C if
the target country is the only source of imports for the sender. The point C is
the equilibrium where the supply curve intersects the demand curve. This will
raise the domestic price of the good up to the level DP Q, because the country
must now produce all of the good domestically.
The change in the welfare of the country can be seen by comparing the
consumer and producer surplus in each graph. Following the imposition of the
quota, the producer surplus would increase to FCH because of the increase in
price. This means that domestic producers would gain from a zero quota. After
the imposition of the quota, the consumer surplus is reduced to FGC because of
the price increase. Consumers would thus be hurt by a zero quota. The net
change in welfare is seen by the area ABC, which is a dead weight loss. The
total effect of the embargo, or a zero quota, would be a net loss. Since one can
consider the effects of a zero quota to be similar to the effects of an embargo, an
embargo would also create a dead weight loss.
Because there are other countries of the world to consider, the actual
effect of the embargo would not be a quota of zero. Most likely however, the
country would be forced to pay at some level above the world price but below
the domestic price, at possibly WPE. This scenario can be seen in figure 6,
"Import Sector Partial Equilibrium Embargo Reality" in the appendix. The
effect of the embargo would be the same as a quota; however, the net loss
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would not be as great. Consumers lose out in this scenario as their surplus
decreases to GLK. Producers gain however, because their surplus increases to
HLJ. The losses from this scenario would most likely be felt by the sender
country, however, if the target's trade constitutes a small fraction of the
sender's trade, then the net loss with be small. The effects could also occur in
the target country's import sector. This would occur because the target would
be forced to purchase goods it originally bought from the sender from a higher
priced supplier. The new net loss would fall to JABK as seen in the graph.
Export Sector Partial Equilibrium
Effects of the embargo can be seen in the export sector as shown in
figure 7, Export Sector Partial Equilibrium Free Trade. The basic ideas are the
same for imports as for exports. In the export sector, the production and
consumption points are determined the same way as in the import sector, by the
intersection of the price line with the supply and demand curves. The
difference is that now the world price under trade is above the intersection of
supply and demand. In the graph, point A is the consumption and point B is the
production. The country would therefore export the difference between the two
points, represented by the distance AB. Consumer and producer surplus is
determined the same way as in the import sector. In this graph the producer
surplus would the area EBH, under free trade. The consumer surplus is GEA.
As one can see the producers are much better off under free trade.
The graph for a quota of zero in the export sector is figure 8, Export
Reality Partial Equilibrium Zero Quota. The effects of the quota would be to
decrease the level of exports to the intersection of supply and demand. Point C
would then be the equilibrium for the target country, assuming the sender was
the only buyer of the good. This will reduce price to DP Q because the country
can no longer export its excess supply of goods, and therefore must consume all
it produces domestically.
The change in the welfare can be seen in this graph by comparing the
consumer and producer surplus. Following the imposition of the quota, the
producer surplus would decrease to FCH because of the decrease in price. This
means that domestic producers would lose from a zero quota. After the quota is
imposed, the consumer surplus is increased to FGC because of the price
decrease. Consumers would thus win from the imposition of a zero quota. The
total effect of the embargo, or a zero quota, would be a net loss, as seen by area
ABC. Since one can consider the effects of a zero quota to be similar to the
effects of an embargo, an embargo would also create a dead weight loss.
Because there are more than two countries in the world, the actual
effect of the embargo would be different than an export quota of zero. Consider
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figure 9, Export Sector Partial Equilibrium Embargo Reality. In most cases, the
country will have to pay a price between WP and DP Q, such as WPE. The
effects again would be similar to a zero quota, except on a smaller scale. The
producer surplus would be the area LKH, which is smaller than with a zero
quota, but larger than under free trade. The consumer surplus in this graph is
GLJ, which is slightly smaller than under free trade, but larger than under a zero
quota. In this instance, the net loss would only be JABK, as compared to ABC.
Assessment of the Cuban Embargo
Applying the information presented previously, one can now clearly
define the sanctions against Cuba. Specifically, the U.S. has imposed a full
trade embargo against Cuba. This is an example of a specific economic linkage,
because the action is taken directly by the U.S. Because of the restrictive
nature, it is also an example of a negative sanction.
Specific Objectives
The sanction was first initiated in order for the U.S. to express its
disapproval of communism. The sanction's original goal sought to cause Cuba
economic hardship in hopes of forcing Castro's communist regime to be
removed.
Over the past four decades, the objectives of the embargo have
evolved. While these objectives have not always been clearly defined, there
were six main goals. These objectives are 1) overthrow Castro, 2) retaliation, 3)
containment, 4) break Soviet Cuban ties, 5) demonstrate opposition, and 6)
change the internal situation. (Kaplowitz, 1998, pg. 3)
In a very general sense, applying only the definition of an embargo, the
embargo against Cuba has been implemented successfully. Because the
embargo has prevented nearly all direct and indirect commercial relations
between those subject to U.S. jurisdiction and Cuba or its nationals, in theory,
the embargo has been successful. When you look at specific goals, however,
the successfulness has varied.
The original goal discussed was to overthrow Castro. It was hoped
that the strain of the sanctions would anger the population and encourage them
to overthrow Castro. Once it was realized that Castro would not be removed
from office, the objective changed to one of retaliation for the confiscation of
U.S. property in Cuba. In total, there was $1.8 billion in claims from the U.S.
against Cuba. In 1960, the State Department said that the purpose of the
embargo was to "defend the legitimate economic interests of [U.S] citizens...
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against the aggressive, injurious and discriminatory policy of Castro's regime."
(Kaplowitz, 1998, pg. 4)
As time evolved, the goal was changed to containment, because it was
clear Castro would not be overthrown, and U.S. citizens would not have their
property returned. Under this new goal, the Cuban revolution was meant to be
deprived by decreasing money available to the Cuban government. In theory, it
was meant to make sure the communist movement did not gain further
momentum and spread to other countries.
Another goal of the economic sanctions was to break the ties between
the Soviet Union and Cuba. It was believed that the increased cost of this
relationship would cause it to break down. Another goal of the U.S. embargo
was symbolic in nature, seeking to express U.S. opposition to the policies of the
Cuban regime. Symbolism itself had two parts to it. The embargo was
supposed to show Cubans that Castro did not have their best interests in mind,
because his policies were the reason the Cubans were cut off from many goods.
It was also supposed to show the rest of the Western Hemisphere that
communism did not belong.
The most recent objective of the economic embargo against Cuba was
to change the internal situation in the country. This was seen as the primary
objective in the 1990's, because of the failure of the original goals. Although
similar to other goals, it is different because it sought to actually change Cuban
policies, instead of just expressing distaste for them. The goal was no longer to
remove Castro rather it now sought any measure that would make the country
more democratic. For example, the Cuban Democracy Act stated a goal was to
"further isolate the Castro regime in order to weaken its repressive apparatus
and to increase pressure for democratic change on the island." (Varona, 1994,
pg. 5) One can see the new goal expressed well in a statement by Assistant
Secretary of State, Bernard Aronson. In March of 1990, Aronson said that "if
Cuba holds fully free and fair elections under international supervision, respects
human rights and stops subverting its neighbors, we can expect relations
between our two countries to improve significantly." (Kaplowitz, 1998, pg. 8)
In 1996 via the Helms-Burton Act, twelve criteria were laid out for
lifting the embargo. Currently, this appears to be the aim of President George
W. Bush, who has made statements such as "If Cuba's government takes all the
necessary steps to ensure that the 2003 elections are certifiably free and fair and
if Cuba also begins to adopt meaningful market-based reforms, then and only
then, I will work with the United States Congress to ease the ban on trade and
travel between the two countries." (Shadid, 2002, pg. 2) Clearly the goal has
now evolved into one less extreme, which is more likely to be realized.
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Assessment of Objectives
The first goal of overthrowing Castro's regime has failed in practice
because of propaganda exposed by Castro. Castro made the Cuban people feel
loyalty to him by blaming the U.S. for the economic problems the country
faced. "Castro blames Cuba's shambles of an economy and endless shortages
on the embargo." (Jacoby, 2002, pg. 2) Although not entirely wrong, Castro's
position is not completely right. It is true that the Cuban people face hardships
because of the embargo; however, Castro does not admit that his economic
policies are to blame for most of the hardships. In general, the U.S. can be
partially blamed for the economic problems, but it is too strong to say the
hardships are entirely the U.S.'s fault. Castro was successful in convincing his
people of this position because he is a very charismatic and persuasive person.
It is important to note that the command economy of Cuba failed like all other
command economies in the past. In general, command economies fail because
they create chronic shortages, as was evident in the former Soviet Union. Cuba
too faces shortages, especially of food, caused by the command economy,
which hinders development.
The goal of retaliation was also not reached. The actual consequence
of the embargo was that it was ensured that the U.S. would not be paid for the
property which was confiscated by the Cuban government.
The goal of containment was partially successful. According to Donna
Kaplowitz in Anatomy of a Failed Embargo, (1998) this objective failed
because the goal was "nebulous, changing, and difficult to obtain." (Kaplowitz,
1998, pg. 6) The main reason this goal was so hard to achieve is because
Cubans turned to another source to finance their revolutions. This other source
was the Soviet Union, which provided a great deal of aid to Cuba during most
of the embargo's life. The embargo did not prevent Cuba from exercising its
influence in other parts of the world, particularly in other South American
countries, and Africa. Remember, Cuba's involvement in other Latin American
countries is what sparked the O.A.S. sanction in the 1960's. Cuba also
supported revolutions in such African countries as Ethiopia and Angola. The
goal was partially successful, however, because communism did not spread
around the globe.
The goal of the embargo in breaking ties with Cuba and the Soviet
Union also failed. Even though the cost of the relationship did increase, the
relationship did not disintegrate, rather it was strengthened. The embargo
caused Cuba to move much closer to the Soviet Union because it was tied to
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Soviet trade and assistance more than ever. When the Soviet Union broke up,
Cuba was greatly harmed because of its reliance on the Soviets.
Some believe that the symbolic goal was achieved (at least originally)
because the U.S. public demanded action. This is no longer the case, as is
evident from a 1998 Gallup poll in which many people stated to re-establish
economic and diplomatic relations with Cuba. (Kaplowitz, 1998, pg. 8) To
many, the objective to change the internal situation in Cuba is no longer valid
because Cuba no longer poses a threat. The reasoning behind this statement is
that without Soviet support Cuba does not have the resources to harm the U.S.
When looking thus far, one can see that the goal to induce change in
Cuba also has not been achieved. Castro's policies are the same as they have
always been, very controlling in nature. Although on the surface it may appear
some policies have changed, upon close examination the policies are empty
promises.
In general, sanctions against Cuba are a tricky matter. The sanctions
were originally imposed unilaterally; however, they were not very effective.
Several other democratic nations later joined in the imposition of sanctions;
however, Cuba was able to find a trade partner-the Soviet Union-to fill the
trade void. In the last few decades though, with the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Cuba has lost its main trading partner. Thus the economic effects are
more prominent in recent history than ever before. This has forced Castro to
make some changes in policy such as dollarization. Dollarization occurred in
Cuba when the dollar was legalized as a currency. Although on the surface it
appears that changes have indeed been made, upon closer inspection one can
see the changes are merely a facade. The dollar is not available to all people,
rather only the elite use this denomination of currency.
There are various reasons offered as to why the embargo has failed.
The basic reason is that the Cuban government has learned to get around the
embargo by trading with other countries. As was seen, this is often a problem.
This was especially true when Cuba turned to trading with the Soviet Union
during much of the embargo's life. Others feel the embargo failed because of
the ingenuity of Fidel Castro. Castro has smartly shifted the blame for Cuban
economic problems onto the U.S. Some also feel the embargo failed because its
goals were too difficult. This is particularly true of the goal to oust Castro.
Here the U.S. tried to exercise too much power.
When looking at the various objectives set forth for the embargo, it is
clear to see why many feel it has been a failure. Many scholars and people in
general feel the embargo has been a failure for good reasons. Scholars such as
Jorge Dominguez have said "In a broad strategic sense, U.S. policies toward
Cuba have failed." (Kaplowitz, 1998, pg. 9) Sanctions expert Margaret Doxey
also agrees, stating that "the general ineffectiveness of the [Cuba] embargoes
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has long been apparent." (Kaplowitz, 1998, pg. 9) Many of the facts seem to
support these scholars' views.
U.S.-Cuban Relations before the Embargo
In order to better understand the effects of the Cuban embargo, one
must be aware of the situation prior to the embargo's implementation.
Following Cuba's independence from Spain in December 1898, Cuba was
administered by the U.S. for four years from 1898 to 1902. From that time until
the 1950's, Cuba and the U.S. had substantial trade. During this time, Cuba
benefited greatly from its close economic ties to the U.S. In fact, in 1959 just
before the implementation of the embargo "Cuba's economic and social
indicators ranked among the highest in the world." (Cubafacts.com, 2002, pg. 1)
In 1958, the U.S. was Cuba's leading trade partner, accounting for
three-quarters of Cuban imports (Kaplowitz, 1994, pg. 11) and eighty five
percent of Cuban exports. (Enterprise Florida Inc., 1999, pg. 1) The U.S. was
also a large investor in Cuba, lending $11 million to the country for
developmental projects in 1958. (Cubafacts.com, 2002, pg 1) In addition,
many people, approximately 300,000 people, from the U.S. would visit Cuba
each year during the 1950's.
Economic Effects of the Embargo
Although in the big picture, Cuban trade made up only a small part of
the total U.S. trade, some industries were hurt extensively. Cuba was an
important source of several goods for the U.S. Cuba supplied the U.S. with a
substantial amount of sugar, cigars, citrus fruits, nickel, and unprocessed
minerals. Several export industries suffered losses due to the embargo
including, agriculture, tourism, port, cruise, and medical supply industries.
Several Cuban sectors were initially harmed a great deal by the embargo,
including the livestock, nickel, and sugar industries. As was shown earlier, the
Soviet Union soon replaced the U.S. as Cuba's leading trade partner and helped
to offset much of the economic effects of the embargo.
By analyzing the trade pattern before the embargo and applying the
trade models, one can get a better idea of the losses created by the embargo.
Using the neoclassical model for three countries, assume the U.S. is the capital
abundant country, while Cuba is labor abundant. This assumption is based on
current export patterns of Cuba, which indicate the economy's reliance on
agriculture.
Let "X" be the capital intensive good and "Y" be the labor intensive
good. Because the U.S. is the most developed country, it is safe to assume the
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U.S.'s relative price of good "X" and "Y" is the lowest. Cuba's relative price
could then fall in the middle or be the highest. If Cuba's relative prices are such
that they are in the middle, the embargo would be ineffective. This is because
based on relative prices prior to the embargo, the U.S. and Cuba would not have
traded extensively.
Due to the extensive amount of U.S.-Cuban trade before the embargo,
it can be assumed that Cuba has the highest relative price. This places the rest
of the world in the middle. This pattern of relative prices would have to be true
in order for trade between the U.S. and Cuba to occur. If the relative prices
were not as such, trade would not have occurred between the countries, because
each would have bought from a lower priced supplier. This means that if
Cuba's relative price was in the middle both the U.S. and Cuba would have
traded more with the rest of the world than with each other. Since there was
substantial trade between the U.S. and Cuba before the implementation of the
embargo, one can assume that Cuba's relative price was in fact the highest.
Such a situation is shown in figure 3, Neoclassical Model Embargo
Reality. The embargo in this case would be harmful to both economics because
each would be forced to buy from a higher price supplier. The country would
thus reduce its imports to 1K, as compared to AB. Exports would also decrease
as well moving from a level of DF to LJ. This would push each country back to
an indifference curve below free trade, but above autarky, shown as ICE. For
the U.S. such a move to a new indifference curve would create small losses,
however, the percentage lost in Cuba would be much bigger simply due to the
size of each economy.
Partial equilibrium analysis can be used to determine the losses caused
by the embargo, because it is known that several sectors were affected more
than others. Because Cuba supplied the U.S. with a great deal of sugar,
consider the sugar market in both Cuba and the U.S.
In Cuba, under free trade the world price for sugar would be above the
autarky price. After the embargo, however, the price level Cuba faced would
fall similar to what would happen if an export quota was imposed. This means
that the world price Cuba faces would lower than the free trade world price, yet
it would remain above autarky price, as shown in figure 9, Export Sector Partial
Equilibrium Embargo Reality. The lowering of world price would decrease the
producer surplus to LKH and increase the consumer surplus to GLJ, relative to
the free trade amounts of EBH and GEA, respectively. The total effect would
be a net loss, as shown by the area AJKB. Note this area is smaller than the loss
created by a zero quota, shown as ABC.
In the U.S. there would be a similar net loss; however, the embargo
would act as a quota on imports. Here the world price would begin below the
equilibrium price, as seen in figure 6, Import Sector Partial Equilibrium
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Embargo Reality. Once the embargo was in place, the world price would rise to
but not as high as the autarky price. This measure would decrease
consumer surplus to GLK, but increase producer surplus to HLJ. The total net
effect would again be negative, as shown by area JKBA.
The trade loses that occurred are in line with the predictions of the
model. The embargo has cost the U.S. an extra $35 million for purchasing
nickel from other suppliers. (Kaplowitz, 1994, pg. 12) Citrus importers also
lost a great deal, totaling $34 million per year. (Kaplowitz, 1994, pg. 12)
Seafood, tobacco, coffee and rum import industries were also harmed. In total
it is estimated that the U.S. has lost $15 to 30 billion due to the embargo.
(Kaplowitz, 1994, pg. 12) Currently the U.S. GDP is over $10 trillion, meaning
the total losses from the embargo accounts for .15 to .03 percent of GDP.
Annually this means the U.S. losses are less then 1 millionth percent of GDP.
The losses incurred by Cuba are not as clear cut, because of their
extensive trade with the Soviet Union. By 1961, the Soviet Union replaced the
U.S. as Cuba's main trading partner. The basic trade agreement called for Cuba
to exchange sugar and nickel for Soviet oil and petroleum products. In fact,
nearly eighty percent of Cuban sugar exports went to the Soviet Union, China,
or other Soviet bloc countries. This measure ensured that the Cuba sugar
market was not greatly harmed by the U.S. sanction.
Although the Soviet Union almost completely replaced the U.S.
demand in the sugar market, it could not do so in every sector of the Cuban
economy. Tourism was especially harmed. Tourists from the Soviet bloc
countries never exceeded 30,000 per year, while approximately 300,000 U.S.
tourists used to visit the island.
Foreign investment in Cuba was basically non-existent until the middle
1980's. At this time, the Cuban government realized Soviet economic
assistance was becoming unsure. Soviet assistance was four to six billion
dollars annually in 1990, which was a forty five percent decline from the
assistance in the previous year. Luckily by 1990, foreign investment from other
countries reached a level of $800 million. Most of the investment has been in
the tourism industry, which caused the industry to perform well in recent years.
It is important to note that the growth of this industry is what led to Cuba's
eventually dollarization.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the effects of the sanction have
been apparent in Cuba. Since the early 1990's, Cuba has faced hard financial
times. The country has faced a vicious cycle of economic hardships caused by
limited capital inflows, and reduced exports which led to lower domestic
production. In fact Cuba is now considered one of the least developed countries
in the Western Hemisphere with a GDP per capita at only $1560. This is a huge
WPE ,
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decrease in the standard of living considering that Cuba was one of the most
developed countries in the 1950's.
It has been hard for Cuba to find alternative suppliers, and markets for
its goods which has reduced production and hindered development.
Agricultural production was especially hurt by the collapse of the Soviet Union.
In fact from 1989 to 1994, agricultural production fell fifty four percent because
of shortages of fuel and equipment.
Currently, Cuba's trade value is much lower than it could have been if
things would have continued as well as they did in the 1950's. Today Cuba's
exports are only valued at $1.8 billion according the CIA World Fact Book.
(World Fact Book 2002) Their primary export trading partners are the
Netherlands (22.4%), Russia (13.3%), Canada (13.3%), Spain (7.3%), and
China (6.2%). (World Fact Book, 2002) The goods exported from Cuba have
remained the same since the 1950's, which has caused the economy to stagnate.
The main exports are sugar, nickel, tobacco, fish, medical products, citrus and
coffee. Goods which are imported have remained similar as well. Imports in
Cuba are primarily petroleum, food, chemicals, machinery and equipment,
which are valued at $4.8 billion. (World Fact Book, 2002) The main import
trading partners are Spain (12.7%), France (6.5%), Canada (5.7%), China
(5.3%), and Italy (5.0%). (World Fact Book, 2002) As one can see from
examining the trade statistics, no trading partner comes close to replacing the
volume of U.S. trade.
The Policy Debate
There are basically eleven reasons for lifting the embargo against Cuba
as defined by Adolfo Leyva De Varona in Propaganda and Reality: A Look at
the U.S. Failed Embargo Against Castro's Cuba (1994). In this section, a brief
discussion on each of the reasons is set forth.
Does the Embargo Cause Suffering?
Some believe the embargo should be lifted because it causes the Cuban
people unnecessary suffering and deprivation. Others go a step further, and
claim the embargo is nothing but harassment of the Cuban people. Because the
U.S. was Cuba's largest trading partner before the sanction, accounting for over
seventy five percent of both Cuban imports and exports, it is believed that
Cubans are cut off from various goods, which only the U.S. could bring to
them. This is of great concern to many because the goods that cause suffering
are the U.S.'s medical advancements. Due to the embargo, medicines that are
only made in the U.S. are denied to people who need them in Cuba.
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Others believe this viewpoint is false. In reality, the suffering of the
Cuban people is caused by Castro's inability to admit that communism has
failed. One must realize the suffering of the Cuban people is not caused
completely by the U.S.; instead the Cuban government is the culprit. In
addition, it is false to believe the embargo encourages suffering, because the
U.S. does allow trade for food and medicine so that the people of Cuba are not
deprived. The U.S. is not the cruel heartless country that Castro portrays.
Will Lifting the Embargo Lead to Change?
Many feel lifting the embargo would bolster economic reform which
would eventually lead to political reform and liberalization. Some feel that the
economic reforms such as joint and private enterprise and dollarization that has
already taken place in Cuba, are a good indication that more reforms would
accompany the lifting of the sanction. These measures are seen as important
steps in the progress toward economic reform that would continue faster if the
embargo was lifted.
Other people agree the embargo should be lifted in order for change to
occur. Some believe that if the embargo is lifted, Castro would become more
confident and take measures to help his country. It is argued that this
liberalization would have to happen because Castro would not be able to blame
the U.S. for every problem the country faces. In this instance, some believe the
embargo simply strengthens Castro. The embargo makes Castro appear to be a
fearless fighter against capitalism, which bolsters his support. This is further
exemplified by anti-Castro Cubans going back and supporting Castro because
they are fearful of the returning exiles coming into power.
Other critics of the embargo feel that a free flow of tourism and trade
to the U.S. would inspire change in Cuba. It is believed that lifting the embargo
would allow more information into the country which the public would use to
encourage change. The increased pressure on the government by the people
would then ensure change.
Those in favor of the embargo believe that such claims are unrealistic.
Even though it appears that several reforms have been made in Cuba, they are a
facade. These beliefs are false because of strict limitations on the reforms. One
of these reforms is the allowance of joint enterprises with foreign investors.
This may seem good on the surface, but upon closer inspection one sees that
Cuban citizens are not allowed to establish their own businesses or join in with
foreigners on investments.
Another reform is the emergence of private enterprises. This is also
hollow because the businesses are extremely regulated. These businesses are
not allowed to have brokers or to hire employees. They are also required to sell
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any food they produce to the government so that a free market does not prevail.
Dollarization is also an empty step taken by the Cuban government. Normal
citizens are not allowed to have dollars, unless they work in Cuba's tourism
industry. This scarcity of the dollar created a powerful black market in Cuba.
In order to combat some of this illegal market, Castro forced some people with
dollars to convert back to the peso. Obviously then, the dollar is not free to
circulate throughout the country.
As it is seen in any interview with Castro, he is already a confident
leader. Lifting the embargo would not increase his confidence further. Even if
it did happen, there is no reason to believe he would suddenly open up to
democracy and liberalization.
It is also false to believe that full tourism and trade will raise
expectations and encourage change in Cuba. People in Cuba already have high
expectations. They hear from their exiled relatives and hope for a better life.
They are not affected by the embargo in this regard. One cannot believe
tourism will be the magic cure to inspire change. It must be remembered that
tourists from the rest of the world go to Cuba and that has not sparked change.
The main reason for this is that most Cubans have nothing to do with the
tourism industry. This fact would not change as long as Castro is in office no
matter if American tourists are on the island.
Have the Objectives been Successful?
Another argument for lifting the embargo is that it has failed. Since
one of the original goals of inspiring change in the country has failed, the
embargo should be done away with. After 30 years, the country is still
communist and is run the same way as it was before. The embargo is clearly
ineffective.
Those in favor of the sanction feel it is unfair to say the embargo has
failed for years. These people point out that only recently, since the collapse of
the Soviet Union, has the embargo begun to work. Prior to that time, it was
ineffective because of the massive amount of aid the Soviets gave to Cuba.
After 1991, when the Soviet subsidies were cut off, is when the economic
effects began to take place in Cuba. It is only since then that we can judge the
effectiveness of the embargo.
Others state the embargo should be lifted because Cuba is no longer a
threat to U.S. security. The reasoning is that since the Cold War is over and the
Soviet Union no longer exists, Cuba does not have the support it once had.
Critics here believe that the embargo is a relic and is outdated because the
circumstances have changed.
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Some people do not believe that Cuba is no longer a threat. Even
though Castro is getting old, there is no reason to believe his attitude has
changed. He still has a lust for international prominence and he still harbors ill
feelings towards the U.S. Both of these characteristics were easily seen in
Barbara Walter's interview with Castro which appeared on ABC's 20/20. We
should not discount Castro as a threat for another reason. He has openly
supported terrorism in the past and there is no reason to believe he does not
now. In the wake of September 1 1 th, this point is of special importance because
of the U.S.'s strong stance against terrorism. The U.S. can no longer give
people the benefit of the doubt that they are docile. Each threat or potential
threat must be taken seriously and the U.S. can no longer ease up on suspected
terrorist supporters, like Castro and the country of Cuba.
Other people believe the embargo is harmful to U.S. businesses. The
idea here is that U.S. businesses are losing out to other investors around the
world in Cuba. Foreign current investors are reaping profits from their
enterprises in Cuba while U.S. businesses miss out on this opportunity for gain.
Those is favor of the sanction feel the reality here is that foreign
investment is not as great as everyone expected. One must also consider the
fact that the Cuban economy is small. Even if opened to U.S. investments there
would not be a great amount, therefore, the U.S. businesses are not missing out
on much.
Is the Embargo Representative?
Another reason the embargo should be lifted, is that U.S. foreign
policy towards Cuba does not reflect the opinions of most Cubans. It is
believed that U.S. policy is controlled by a small conservative group of Cuban
exiles that do not represent the general sentiment of the Cuban people. It is
believed that these exiles only represent the opinions of a small minority.
An additional objection to the embargo stems from this idea. Some
critics believe "Cuban exiles are insensitive to the suffering caused by the
embargo because they have little in common with those that are left behind in
Cuba." (Varona, 1994, pg. 41) The concept here is that the exiles do not know
what conditions are like now, they only know of the previous ones. The
conditions and opinions of people in Cuba may have changed and they (the
exiles) will have no idea of the current situation.
People in favor of the embargo believe that most Cuban exiles are
represented by the U.S. policy towards Cuba. The fact is that eighty three
percent of exiles from Cuba approve of the embargo. (Varona, 1994, pg. 38) It
is false to say that the exiles do not know what the people in Cuba are currently
going through. What some fail to realize, is that exiles are truly representative

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

27

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 6

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & LAW

of the Cuban people, because they come from all walks of life, so every class is
represented. One must also realize that exiles still have contact with those left
behind, so they are aware of the current situation.
The final reason offered why the embargo should be lifted is because
the Cuban people have done nothing to suggest they want change. Proponents
of this view say that the population of Cuba has shown no willingness to fight
for change. Since the people of Cuba do not want change, then the U.S. has no
business forcing it upon them. Critics of this argument suggest that the people
of Cuban do want change, but they are afraid to take measures against the
government. According to those exiled, the people of Cuba do not agree with
Castro and would like to see change. The people, however, know they do not
have the power to force any change in the country.
Outlook for the Future: Recommendation to Policy Makers
My recommendation to policy makers is simple. Lift the embargo. It
is proven that free trade is advantageous to an economy; therefore, this is the
situation we should strive for. Although opening trade with Cuba would not be
a big boost to the U.S. economy, it would help. Even though Cuba is a small
market, it is still one which is unsaturated with U.S. goods. Opening the
embargo would only help the U.S. economy at this point. It would also greatly
help the Cuban economy, which has been suffering since the collapse of the
Soviet Union. As was stated in the Boston Globe in August 2002, "U.S.
sanctions against Cuba have done little but deny Cubans goods made in the
United States while denying Americans potential business in Cuba." (Jacoby,
2002, pg. 2)
Economically speaking, the embargo should be lifted, but we also have
to consider the political issues. The biggest objection to lifting the embargo is
that the U.S. will be giving into communism. This is not a valid objection. The
U.S. has begun to trade with China, and they are still communist, so why should
Cuba not be traded with? Sheer common sense will tell anyone that Cuba is
much less of a threat to the U.S. than China.
The main reason the U.S. should lift the embargo is because it has
failed to reach its most basic objective of forcing political change in Cuba.
Representative Jeff Flake of Arizona said that the embargo has "Failed to
produce any meaningful political or economic change in Cuba." (Lawrence,
2002, pg. 2) All the embargo has done is given Castro a tool for making the
U.S. appear evil to the Cuban people. As stated by Jeff Jacoby in the Boston
Globe, the U.S. is blamed for all the problems of the Cuban economy.
Removing the embargo may help the Cuban people to stop seeing Americans as
the bad guys because they would have access to more goods. In my opinion,
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only by opening trade can we really hope for any change to take place. This is
the same opinion expressed by former President Jimmy Carter, who has said
that "the best way to promote peaceful change in Cuba is through the maximum
contacts between our two countries." (Keen, 2002, pg. 2)
Predictions for the Future
Although trade with Cuba seems insignificant on a large scale, the
embargo has caused great losses. Once it is lifted both economies will receive a
boost. According to Rosson and Adcock, (2001) it is expected all fifty states
would receive increases in economic output, income, value added and
employment caused by opening trade. For the Cuban Policy Foundation,
Rosson and Adcock conducted extensive research involving the "economic
impacts of expanded U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba" (Rosson and Adcock,
2001. pg. i) using an input-output model. Rosson and Adcock analyzed the
effects in three separate scenarios. The first scenario allowed trade, but on a
very restricted scale. The second allowed for more moderate trade between
Cuba and the U.S. The final scenario anticipated a large volume of trade
between the U.S. and Cuba once the embargo was lifted.
It has been predicted that the U.S. would gain $1 to 2 billion in exports
via trade with Cuba. (Kaplowitz, 1994, pg. 5) This increase would lead to an
increase of $47 million to 1.6 billion in GDP as well as create 1,000 to 31,262
jobs in the agricultural industry. (Rosson and Adcock, 2001, pg. i) The
increase in jobs would help raise household income between $25 million and
$818 million. (Rosson and Adcock, 2001. pg. i) The moderate export growth
scenario calls for large increases on average. Under this scenario, agricultural
exports are expected to increase GDP by $517 million. (Rosson and Adcock,
2001. pg. i) Also, 10,656 jobs are expected to be created, and household
income is expected to rise to $273 million. (Rosson and Adcock, 2001. pg. i)
These large increases are seen because of the expected market share regain by
U.S. companies. U.S. companies are expected to regain 33 to 50 percent of
Cuban trade. (Kaplowitz, 1994, pg. 5)
Opening trade would help specific industries. In particular it is
expected to affect at least 22 commodity sectors in the U.S. One area that
would receive a boost would be the U.S. agricultural industry. This is based on
current trade patterns of Cuba which show that agricultural imports are the
greatest. Here it is expected that ending the embargo would lead to a $37.5
million to 1.24 billion increase in agricultural exports, as well as $84 million to
3.6 billion increase in business sales. (Rosson and Adcock, 2001, pg. i)
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As we have seen, U.S.-Cuban trade would definitely help the U.S.
economy. Even though it may be a small percentage in total, the increases can
not be ignored or written off as completely insignificant.
Conclusion
By moving from a general understanding of what sanctions are to a
more specific look at the Cuban embargo, it is my hope that a reader has gained
a greater understanding of economic sanctions against Cuba. Sanctions have
been a part of international politics for many years. Recently, they have
become more popular as policy makers have begun to favor the liberal over the
realist approach to foreign policy. Although there are only a few basic types of
sanctions, there are many potential purposes, which vary according to each
situation. In general the purpose of sanctions is to harm the economy of the
target country. The effects of these sanctions can be analyzed using either a
general or partial equilibrium approach.
It has been shown that the U.S. imposed one type of embargo, a trade
embargo, against Cuba beginning over forty years ago. This embargo was
originally initiated during the Cold War, in hopes of ridding the Western
Hemisphere of communism. The goals of the Cuban embargo have changed
over the years, but one fact remains, nearly all of these objectives have failed.
Even though the goals of the embargo have failed there is still a policy debate
over what should be done. Although some policy makers feel that we should
keep the embargo in place, public sentiment, has become increasingly
unsupportive.
Various economic models show that lifting the embargo would be
beneficial to both Cuba and the United States. The benefits would be greater
for Cuba, however, because of the relative size of the two economies. This is
based on a basic economic fact that free trade is beneficial. Because of the
economic benefits that will be achieved, and the fact that many of the
embargo's objectives have failed, it was recommended that the embargo be
lifted. Both economically and politically this is the better solution. It is
obvious that a future without the embargo looks brighter. One hopes that policy
makers will consider all these facts when considering this matter in the future.
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Figure 1: Neoclassical Free Trade

Figure 2: Neoclassical Autarky
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Figure 3: Neoclassical
Embargo Reality
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Figure 4: Import Sector Partial
Equilibrium - Free Trade
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Figure 5: Import Sector Partial Equilibrium - Zero Quota
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Figure 7: Export Sector Partial
Equilibrium - Free Trade
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Figure 8: Export Sector Partial Equilibrium
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Figure 9: Export Sector Partial Equilibrium - Embargo Reality
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